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Labor
Labor; inmate labor-emergency services during a natural disaster
Penal Code § 2701 (amended).
AB 768 (Rainey); 1994 STAT. Ch. 494
Under existing law, the Department of Corrections is authorized to use state
prisoners to provide labor for public use needed by or for the state or federal
government, except for services under the jurisdiction of the Prison Industry
Authority.' Chapter 494 expands existing law by authorizing the Department of
Corrections to use inmate labor to provide emergency services for public or
private property during a county level state of emergency' due to a natural
disaster.'
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2700 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (requiring labor of every able-bodied state
prisoner); id. § 2701 (amended by Chapter 494) (authorizing the use of state inmate labor to render services
as needed by the state, or any political subdivision, or for public use); see also id. § 2690 (West 1982)
(authorizing the temporary removal of inmates from prison for up to three days); id. § 2717.1(b) (West Supp.
1994) (defining joint venture employer as any public entity, nonprofit or for profit entity, organization, or
business that contracts with the Director of Corrections for the purpose of employing inmate labor); id. §
2717.2 (West Supp. 1994) (creating a joint inmate labor program within state prison facilities between the state
prison system and joint venture employers); id. § 2760 (West Supp. 1994) (allowing the Department of
Transportation to use inmate labor for improvement and maintenance of state highways); id. § 2780 (West
1982) (authorizing labor at mobile camps); id. § 2780.5 (West Supp. 1994) (allowing the use of prisoner labor
up to 25 miles outside California state borders during declared fire emergencies); id. § 2801 (West Supp. 1994)
(declaring the purposes of the Prison Industry Authority); id. § 2805 (West Supp. 1994) (giving the Prison
Industry Authority jurisdiction over certain industrial, agricultural, and service operations, and the power to
establish new operations when appropriate); 33 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 174, 175 (1959) (allowing inmates at a
California men's institution to be used to clean up adjoining private property owned by a non-profit association
for sanitation and fire prevention purposes, where the clean-up would benefit both the association and the
institution). See generally 49 CAL. JUR. 3D Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 104-119 (1979 & Supp.
1994) (providing an overview of employment of state prisoners); id. §§ 104-110 (1979 & Supp. 1994) (giving
a general overview of inmate labor, manufacture of goods, work in facilities other than state agencies, and
compensation and payment); id. §§ 111-114 (1979 & Supp. 1994) (providing an overview of inmate labor on
state highways); id. §§ 115-118 (1979 & Supp. 1994) (providing an overview of inmate labor in work camps);
id. § 119 (1979 & Supp. 1994) (giving an overview of labor in institutions for women); Annotation, Failure
of Prisoners to Return at Expiration of Work Furlough or Other Permissive Release Period as Crime of
Escape, 76 A.L.R. 3D 658 (1977 & Supp. 1993) (analyzing cases which discuss whether the conduct of an
inmate, confined in a correctional facility, who was permitted to leave the facility without surveillance and who
failed to return to the facility, constituted the crime of escape); Timothy M. Hall, Annotation, Coverage, Under
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201 et. seq.), of Prisoners Working for Private Individuals
or Entities Other Than Prisons, 110 A.L.R. FED. 839 (1992) (analyzing state and federal cases which discuss
whether prisoners working for nonprison businesses and individuals entitled to the protections of the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
2. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8558(c) (West 1992) (defining local emergency to be a proclaimed
condition of disaster or extreme peril within a county or city, which is likely to be beyond the control of the
services of that political division and requires outside aid, such as fire, flood, and epidemic aid).




Prisoners already provide labor for the state and federal government, including
labor during fire emergencies Chapter 494 was enacted to provide the
Department of Corrections with more employment options for state prisoners
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 494, there was no specific provision for the use
of inmate labor to preserve private property.
6
Maria V Daquipa
Labor; referral fees-regulation of fees collected by talent agencies
Labor Code §§ 1700.25, 1700.40 (amended).
AB 1901 (Speier); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1032
Existing law, known as the Talent Agencies Act, generally protects persons
employed in the California entertainment industry in various ways.' Under
existing law, talent agencies2 are required to be licensed Existing law also
4. Id. § 2700 (West Supp. 1994); see supra note I (explaining the statutory provisions for Inmate
labor).
5. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 768, at 2 (Mar. 8, 1994).
6. 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 1549, sec. 7, at 6036 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 2701); see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 2701 (amended by Chapter 494) (adding the provision that prisoner labor may be used for preservation
of property, either public or private).
1. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); see, e.g., id. § 1700.23 (West 1989)
(providing for required statements in talent agency contracts); id. § 1700.32 (West 1989) (forbidding false
promises or representations concerning employment); id. § 1700.33 (West 1989) (prohibiting a talent agency
from sending an artist to any place where that person's health, safety, or welfare could be adversely affected);
id. § 1700.34 (West 1989) (restricting a talent agency from sending minors to saloons or places where
intoxicating liquors are sold or consumed on the premises); id. § 1700.35 (West 1989) (providing that
prostitutes, gamblers, intoxicated persons, or procurers cannot be employed in or allowed to frequent the place
of business of the talent agency); id. § 1700.39 (West 1989) (making illegal the practice of fee splitting,
wherein a talent agency divides fees with an employer, an agent, or other employee of an employer); Id. §
1700.40 (Vest 1989) (prohibiting registration fees and requiring refunds to artists failing to procure
employment); Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 350-51, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364, 367 (1967)
(advocating the belief that the precursor to the Talent Agencies Act was a remedial statute enacted for the
protection of those seeking employment and was a proper exercise of the police power of the state); id. at 351,
62 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (suggesting that a contract between an unlicensed talent agency and an artist is void); see
also James M. O'Brien III, Regulation of Attorneys under California's Talent Agencies Act: A Tautological
Approach to Protecting Artists, 80 CAL. L. REV. 471, 487-92 (1992) (explaining in detail that the Talent
Agencies Act is an elaborate scheme to regulate the entertainment industry). See generally Gary Stem, Guide
to Agents; Securing, Signing, Freelancing, Staying or Switching, BACK STAGE, Apr. 17, 1987, at IA
(discussing the experiences of actual performers with talent agents).
2. See CAL LAB. CODE § 1700A(a) (West 1989) (defining talent agency as a person or corporation
that engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or
engagements for an artist or artists, except that the activities of procuring, offering, or promising to procure
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requires that any matter of controversy be heard and determined by the Labor
Commissioner,4 subject to de novo review by the superior court on appeal An
recording contracts for an artist or artists must not of itself subject a person or corporation to regulation and
licensing); id. (stating that talent agencies may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the development of their
professional careers); Wachs v. Curry, 13 Cal. App. 4th 616, 621, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496, 499 (1993) (asserting
that several personal managers had standing to challenge the facial constitutionality of the Talent Agencies
Act's licensing requirement, on its face, as they were persons aggrieved by alleged vagueness and members
of the class against whom it allegedly discriminated, but several managers had no standing to challenge the
particular application of the statute to them because no particular facts were before the Court of Appeal in the
suit against state officials charged with enforcing the Act), laterproceeding, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 3418 (1993);
id. at 625-26, 16 Cal. Rptr 2d. at 501-02 (stating that the exemption from the Talent Agencies Act licensing
requirement for those engaged in procuring recording contracts but not other kinds of contracts has a rational
basis, and thus, the classification does not violate equal protection since negotiations for recording contracts
are commonly conducted by a personal manager, rather than by a talent agent); id. at 627-28, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 503-04 (opining that the provision of the Talent Agencies Act requiring licensing of those engaged in the
occupation of procuring employment imposes a standard that measures the significance of the agent's
employment procurement function compared to the counseling function taken as a whole, and thus, the
provision is not void for vagueness); id. at 628, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503 (noting that if the employment
procurement function is the significant part of the agent's business as a whole, then he or she is subject to the
licensing requirement, even if, with respect to a particular client, procurement of employment was only
incidental; however, if counseling and directing clients' careers is the significant part of the agent's business,
then he or she is not subject to the licensing requirement, even if, with respect to a particular client, counseling
was only an incidental part of the agent's overall duties).
3. CAL LAB. CODE § 1700.5 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (prohibiting persons from engaging in or
carrying on the occupation of a talent agency without first procuring a license from the Labor Commissioner);
id. (requiring the license to be posted in a conspicuous place in the office of the licensee, and mandating that
the license number be referred to in any advertisement for the purpose of the solicitation of talent for the talent
agency); Humes v. MarGil Ventures, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 486,493-95,220 Cal. Rptr. 186, 189-90 (1985)
(noting that an actress who filed an action in superior court seeking rescission of an employment agreement
with her manager based on the manager's fraud, duress, and undue influence was not precluded by the election
of remedies doctrine from filing a petition before the Labor Commissioner seeking to have the employment
agreement voided based on the manager's violation of the licensing requirements); Buchwald v. Superior
Court. 254 Cal. App. 2d at 347, 354, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364, 369 (1967) (suggesting that it would be unreasonable
to construe the precursor to the Talent Agencies Act as applying only to licensed talent agencies and thereby
allow talent agencies by nonsubmission to the licensing provisions of the Act to exclude themselves from its
restrictions and regulations); 11 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 156 (1950) (opining that agencies, bureaus, or businesses,
which referred applicants for employment to prospective employers and received fees solely from the
employer, came within the licensing provisions of the precursor to the Talent Agencies Act); 15 Op. Cal. Att'y
Gen. 155, 156-57 (1950) (stating that one who published a "casting" directory containing photographs,
descriptions, and telephone numbers of persons seeking employment in the entertainment and motion picture
field, and who agreed to circulate the directory among motion picture producers and talent agents for an annual
fee to be paid by those seeking employment, was not operating an employment agency and was not required
to obtain a license).
4. See CAL LAB. CODE § 98 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that the Labor Commissioner has the authority
to investigate employee complaints and listing the procedural aspects in the event of a hearing).
5. Id. § 1700.44(a) (West 1989); see id. (requiring that in cases of controversy arising under Chapter
4 (commencing with § 1700) of the California Labor Code, the parties involved must refer the matters in
dispute to the Labor Commissioner, who will hear and determine the dispute, subject to an appeal within 10
days after determination, to the superior court where the dispute will be heard de novo); id. (noting that to stay
any award for money, the aggrieved party must execute a bond approved by the superior court in a sum not
exceeding twice the amount ofjudgment, and in all other cases the bond must be in a sum not less than $1,000
and be approved by the superior court); Buchwald v. Katz, 8 Cal. 3d 493, 498-99, 503 P.2d 1376, 1378-79,
105 Cal. Rptr. 368, 370-71 (1972) (stating that the party appealing from the Labor Commissioner's
determination in an arbitration proceeding under the predecessor to the Talent Agencies Act was required to
file a bond in order to stay enforcement of an award although the award had not been reduced to judgment by
judicial confirmation, even though California Labor Code § 1700.44 specifies a bond and refers to this bond
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exception to this rule occurs if the contract of the parties contains an arbitration
provision meeting certain criteria.6 Under prior law, a talent agency was required
to disburse to an artist 7 any money received on behalf of that artist within 15 days
of receipt.8
Chapter 1032 alters the requirement for disbursement of funds, mandating such
disbursement to take place within 30 days of receipt by a licensed talent agency,
but would permit retention of the funds where they must be used to offset an
obligation of the artist to the talent agency or where the funds are the subject of
in a sum not exceeding twice the amount of judgment); id. at 499, 503 P.2d at 1379, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 371
(declaring that on appeal from the Labor Commissioner's determination in the arbitration proceeding, the
superior court may only require a bond in order to stay an award, that the superior court erred in requiring a
bond in order to prosecute an appeal, and that the superior court abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal
for failure to post a bond); id. (noting that where the party appealing from the Labor Commissioner's
determination in an arbitration proceeding did not file a bond, the other party was free to enforce the
Commissioner's money award, and the proper procedure is first to apply to the superior court for judicial
confirmation and to then enforce the ensuing judgment); id. at 502-03, 503 P.2d at 1381-82, 105 Cal, Rptr. at
373-74 (stating that notice of appeal from a determination of the Labor Commissioner in an arbitration
proceeding was not required to allege grounds for review, and noting that the Commissioner may call up
pleadings or other papers or documents by which the parties presented their claims and defenses before the
Commissioner or may require the parties to present such claims and defenses in more formal pleadings);
Humes v. MarGil Ventures, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 486, 494-95, 220 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190 (1985) (declaring that
a petition filed by an actress before the Labor Commissioner seeking to have an employment agreement voided
based on the manager's violation of the licensing requirement was properly and necessarily brought before the
Labor Commissioner under the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, since California Labor Code § 1700.44,
which provides for hearing and determination of disputes by the Labor Commissioner is mandatory, and the
Labor Commissioner had original jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy); id. at 496, 220 Cal. Rptr.
at 191 (stating that the powers of an arbitrator, which are shared by the Labor Commissioner, include the power
to postpone a hearing on request of a party, for good cause, or upon his own determination); Sinnamon v.
McKay, 142 Cal. App. 3d 847, 850-54, 191 Cal. Rptr. 295, 297-300 (1983) (asserting that under Califomia
Labor Code § 1700.44 the time to file an appeal does not begin to run until after service of notice of the
determination).
6. CAL LAB. CODE § 1700.45 (West 1989); see id. (declaring that a provision in a contract providing
for the decision by arbitration of any controversy under the contract as to its existence, validity, construction,
performance, nonperformance, breach, operation, continuance, or termination, will be valid if: (1) The
provision is contained in a contract between a talent agency and a person for whom the talent agency under
the contract undertakes to endeavor to secure employment; or (2) the provision is inserted in the contract
pursuant to any rule, regulation, or contract of a bona fide labor union regulating the relations of its member,
to a talent agency; and the contract provides for reasonable notice to the Labor Commissioner of the time and
place of all arbitration hearings; and the contract provides that the Labor Commissioner or his or her authorized
representative has the right to attend all arbitration hearings); Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d
347, 359-60, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364, 372-73 (1967) (declaring that where artists brought a proceeding in court to
restrain a representative from proceeding with arbitration provisions as provided in a contract between the
representative and the artists, the artists did not waive their right to proceed before the Labor Commissioner);
id. at 360, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (stating that where evidence before the Labor Commissioner created a prima
facie showing that a contract between artists and a representative was in fact an artists' manager contract, the
Labor Commissioner had jurisdiction notwithstanding a contract provision for arbitration).
7. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(b) (West 1989) (defining artists as actors and actresses rendering
services on the legitimate stage and in the production of motion pictures, radio artists, musical artists, musical
organizations, directors of legitimate stage, motion picture and radio productions, musical directors, writers,
cinematographers, composers, lyricists, arrangers, models, and other artists and persons rendering professional
services in motion picture, theatrical, radio, television, and other entertainment enterprises),
8. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 488, sec. 10, at 514; see CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.25(a) (amended by Chapter
1032) (noting that a licensee who receives any payment of funds on behalf of an artist must immediately
deposit that amount in a trust fund account maintained by him or her in a bank or other recognized depository).
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a controversy before the Labor Commissioner involving a dispute as to the
amount of a fee alleged to be owed to the talent agency.9 Chapter 1032 expressly
makes any withholding of funds by a talent agency beyond the thirty-day period
a controversy subject to the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner if: (1) The
withholding of funds is disputed by the artist; (2) the dispute is referred to the
Labor Commissioner; and (3) the contract of the parties does not contain an
arbitration provision preempting the Labor Commissioner's jurisdiction. 0
Chapter 1032 authorizes the Labor Commissioner to award attorney's fees and
interest to an artist whose funds are withheld by a talent agency in willful
violation of the requirement for disbursement within the thirty-day period."
Chapter 1032 prohibits talent agencies from referring artists for certain types
of services to persons, firms, or corporations in which the talent agency has a
financial interest.'2 Chapter 1032 also prohibits talent agencies from accepting a
referral fee or similar compensation from any person, firm, or corporation
providing certain services to an artist under contract to the talent agency.
3
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 1032 was enacted to offer further protection for artists who face
difficulty in receiving compensation for their services.' 4 The public perception of
fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation, and deceit in the talent industry is fostered
by a seemingly unending array of media reports that expose such abuses.'5
9. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.25(a)(1)-(2) (amended by Chapter 1032).
10. Id. § 1700.25(c) (amended by Chapter 1032). If there is an arbitration provision in a contract, the
contract need not provide that the talent agency agrees to refer any controversy between the applicant and the
talent agency regarding the terms of the contract to the Labor Commissioner for adjustment, and California
Labor Code § 1700.44 will not apply to controversies pertaining to the contract. Id. § 1700A5 (West 1989).
11. Id. § 1700.25(e)(l)-(2) (amended by Chapter 1032).
12. Id. § 1700.40(b) (amended by Chapter 1032). The financial interest for other services to be rendered
to the artist includes, but is not limited to, photography, audition tapes, demonstration reels or similar materials,
business management, personal management, coaching, dramatic school, casting or talent brochures, agency-
client directories, or other printing. Id.
13. Id. § 1700.40(c) (amended by Chapter 1032).
14. SENATE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1901, at 2 (Apr.
13, 1994); see id. (stating that dozens of artists have complained that they are not being paid for their services
on a timely basis and sometimes are not paid at all).
15. See Andrea Wolper, Sexual Harassment: Are You a Target?, BACK STAGE, Apr. 16, 1993, at 1
(discussing how the entertainment industry is a breeding ground of exploitation embodied in such realities as
sexism, racism, heterosexism, and age discrimination, and stating that artists are often naive and trusting to
their own detriment); see also Cleveland Horton, Coke/CAA Draws Flak; Agent Charges Conflict of Interest,
Unfair Business, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 30, 1991, at I (describing one man's attempt to point out a possible
conflict of interest, unfair business practices, and restraint of trade issues with respect to a talent agency); Rob
Kendt, Who You Gonna Call? Why Most Hollywood Scams Fall Through the Cracks in Enforcement, BACK
STAGE, Nov. 19, 1993, at IW (detailing "kickbacks" and ripoffs and offering a checklist of warnings to avoid
being defrauded); David Nickell, State Takes Aim at Bogus Talent Agencies, S. FLA. Bus. J., Dec. 28, 1987,
at I (documenting complaints about con artists who attempted to bypass Florida law by calling themselves
casting directors, a totally unregulated profession in that state at that time); Bill Stokes, Kid Models' Moms
Charge Child Abuse, CHI. TRiB. Mar. 14, 1985, at 3 (reporting on the concerns of parents about the disregard
for the welfare of child models); Thomas Walsh, NYC Cries Foul vs. Model/Talent Finns for Scam Rackets,
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Legislatures in other states have enacted similar protections to safeguard artists, 16
and California is following this trend by continuing to mold the Talent Agencies
Act into a device which can protect artists as they seek employment or attempt to
advance their careers in California's entertainment industry. 7
Joseph A. Tommasino
Labor; smoking-statewide ban at place of employment
Labor Code § 6404.5 (new).
AB 13 (T. Friedman); 1994 STAT. Ch. 310
Existing law requires employers' to provide and maintain a safe and healthful
place of employment.2 This law is enforced by assessing misdemeanor penalties
for violations of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act.3 Existing law
BACK STAGE, Sept. 24, 1993, at I (stating that models and performers are often subjected to hundreds of
variations on age-old "come-ons," such as paying for expensive and generally unnecessary portfolios,
headshots, lessons, seminars, and other pre-employment services).
16. FiA. STAT. ANN. § 468.408 (West 1991) (allowing aggrieved parties to maintain an action upon the
bond of an agency); id. § 468.410 (West 1991) (prohibiting registration fees and referrals); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 5221a-9 (West Supp. 1994) (prohibiting talent agencies from engaging in false, misleading,
or deceptive acts or practices).
17. CAL LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (detailing a comprehensive regulatory
regime governing the business affairs of talent agencies). But see O'Brien, supra note 1, at 510 (1992)
(concluding that the Act's legislative history, its ambiguous language, and California's legal-ethics rules
governing attorney conduct render regulation of attorney behavior under the Act unfair, unnecessary, and
redundant, thus warranting an exemption for attorneys).
1. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3300(a)-(d) (West 1989) (defining employer as every statq agency, each
county, city, district, and all public and quasi public corporations and public agencies, and every person,
including any public service corporation which has any natural person in service, or the legal representative
of any deceased employer).
2. Id. § 6300 (West 1989); see id. (stating that the general purpose of the California Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1973 is to assure a safe and healthful working condition for all California working
women and men, as well as encouraging employers to maintain safe and healthful working conditions);
Carmona v. Division of Indus. Safety, 13 Cal. 3d 303,312, 530 P.2d 161, 167, 118 Cal. Rptr. 473,479 (1975)
(declaring that under the relevant Labor Code provisions, the employer's duty to maintain a safe working
environment will be interpreted in the broadest possible manner); Salwasser Mfg. Co. v. Municipal Court, 94
Cal. App. 3d 223,227, 156 Cal. Rptr. 292,295 (1979) (noting that the California Supreme Court has indicated
that the purpose stated in California Labor Code § 6300 should be given a liberal interpretation, to ensure a
safe work environment).
3. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6423(a)-(d) (West 1989); see id. (stating that every employer or management
person in control of the place of employment or employee will be guilty of a misdemeanor for violating the
standards of this Act, unless another penalty is specifically provided); id. (providing that violations are
punishable by possible imprisonment of six months and/or a fine of up to $5000); see also id. §§ 6300-6717
(West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth the provisions of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act).
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also bans the smoking of tobacco inside and within five feet of a main entrance
of all state buildings
Chapter 310 prohibits an employer from knowingly or intentionally permitting
any person to smoke any tobacco product in enclosed places of employment
within the state, except in specified areas.' Chapter 310 provides that an employer
who allows non-employees access to the place of business will not have acted
knowingly or intentionally if the employer has taken reasonable steps to prevent
the non-employee from smoking in the enclosed space.6
Chapter 310 creates a uniform state standard that supersedes all local
enactments or enforcement of local ordinances that regulate the smoking of
tobacco in places of employment.7 Chapter 310 allows, but does not require,
employers to provide designated breakrooms for the smoking of tobacco!
4. CAL GOV'T CODE § 19994.31 (West Special Pamphlet 1994); cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
601.02(A)-(I) (1993) (prohibiting smoking in any building owned or directly leased by the state except under
certain exceptions); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-40-204(1)-(4) (1993) (prohibiting smoking in specified areas of
buildings both owned and occupied by the state); OR. REv. STAT. § 243.350(1) (1991) (providing that rules
will be adopted that restrict smoking in places of employment operated by departments or agencies of the state
of Oregon); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-106 (Supp. 1993) (prohibiting smoking in public places, public
meetings or government buildings).
5. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 310); see id. § 6404.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 310)
(describing legislative intent and declaring that regulation of smoking in the workplace is a matter of statewide
interest and concern); see also id. § 6404.5(d)(1)-(12) (enacted by Chapter 310) (stating that place of
employment does not include specified portions of hotels, motels, or similar transient lodging establishments,
meeting and banquet rooms restricted by specified exemptions, retail or wholesale tobacco shops, private
smokers' lounges, cabs of motor trucks or truck tractors if no nonsmoking employees are present, certain
warehouse facilities, gaming clubs, bars and taverns subject to certain conditions, theatrical production sites,
medical research or treatment sites where smoking is an integral part of the production or research, a private
residence unless it is used as a family day care home, and patient smoking areas in long-term health care
facilities); id. §6404.5(f)(l)-(3) (establishing the timeframe and manner in which a prohibitive smoking
regulation will be adopted for gaming clubs, bars, and taverns); cf. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 433.835-.990 (1992)
(providing the policy and parameters of the Oregon Indoor Clean Air Act, the designated areas where smoking
is allowed, where the posting of signs are required, what the duties of the Health Division are, as well as the
enforcement, waiver and penalty provisions of the act).
6. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5 (enacted by Chapter 310); see id. § 6404.5(c)(l)-(2) (enacted by Chapter
310) (defining reasonable steps as the posting of clear and prominent signs stating, "No Smoking" or "Smoking
is prohibited except in designated areas," and where the employer requests the non-employee to refrain from
smoking in the enclosed areas). Reasonable steps do not include the physical ejectment of the non-employee,
or requesting the non-employee to refrain from smoking where there would be a risk of physical harm in
making the request. Id.
7. Id. § 6404.5(g) (enacted by Chapter 310); see id. (stating that the practical effect of this statute is
to eliminate the need of local governments to enact enclosed workplace smoking regulations within their
respective jurisdictions); see also id. § 6404.5(i) (enacted by Chapter 310) (stating that if this statute is repealed
or modified, local governments have the power to enforce previously enacted or new restrictions on the
smoking of tobacco in enclosed areas of employment, and that local regulations placed upon smoking tobacco
in areas not defined as a place of employment, or regulated by this statute will be enforceable).
8. Id. § 6404.5(d)(13) (enacted by Chapter 310); see id. § 6404.5(d)(13)(A)-(C) (enacted by Chapter
310) (requiring the designated smoking rooms to dispense the air directly to the outside of the building, to
comply with ventilation standards adopted by Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board or the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency, to establish the rooms in a nonwork area where nonsmokers are not required
to enter, and to provide sufficient nonsmoking breakrooms for nonsmokers); see also id. § 6404.5(h) (enacted
by Chapter 310) (showing that this statute does not prevent an employer from prohibiting smoking in any
enclosed place of employment for any reason).
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Additionally, Chapter 310 permits an employer to allow smoking where the
business employs a total of five or fewer part-time or full-time employees and
other conditions are met.
A violation of Chapter 310 is only punishable by specified fines.'" The
Division of Occupational Safety and Health" will not be required to respond to
any complaint regarding the smoking restrictions, unless the employer has been
found guilty of a third violation of Chapter 310 within the previous year.2
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 310 was enacted to protect California workers from the serious
adverse health effects of environmental tobacco smoke. 3 A fear of increased
workers' compensation claims caused by workplace exposure to tobacco smoke
was a major concern of the California Restaurant Association and the Senate
Judiciary Committee in passing this bill. 4
9. Id. § 6404.5(d)(14) (enacted by Chapter 310); see id. § 6404.5(d)(14)(A)-(D) (enacted by Chapter
310) (requiring that the area be inaccessible to minors, that no one will be required to work in the area where
smoking is permitted, that all employees who enter the area, without coercion, consent to permit smoking, that
air from the smoking area be exhausted directly to the outside, and that the employer comply with any
ventilation standards or use appropriate technology as adopted by either the Occupational Health Standards
Board or the Federal Environmental Protection Agency); id. § 6404.5(d)(14)(D) (enacted by Chapter 310)
(declaring that the five or fewer employee exemption does not supersede or render inapplicable any condition
or limitation on smoking areas made applicable to specific business establishments by any other provision of
California Labor Code § 6404.5(d)(1)-(13)).
10. Jd. § 6404.50) (enacted by Chapter 310); see id. (stating that a violation of California Labor Code
§ 6404.5(b) is an infraction punishable by a fine up to $100 for the first violation, $200 for the second violation
within one year, and $500 for a third and for each subsequent violation within a year). Enforcement will be
carried out by local law enforcement agencies, including local health departments, as determined by local
governing bodies. Id.
11. See id. § 6302(d) (West 1989) (defining the Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Division));
id. § 6307 (West 1989) (defining the Division's power, jurisdiction and supervision); id. § 6308 (Vest 1989)
(describing the Division's enforcement powers).
12. Id. § 6404.5(k) (enacted by Chapter 310); see id. (declaring that this provision does not supersede
the provisions of California Labor Code § 6309); see also id. 6309 (Vest 1989) (describing the Division's
responsibilities and discretion as to investigations, response to complaints, and protection of complainants in
the place of employment).
13. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrrEE, CoMMirrEE ANALYSIS oFAB 13, at 6 (Mar. 22, 1994) (stating
that scientific evidence regarding the harmful effects of environmental tobacco smoke is abundant). But see
id. (stating that the tobacco industry disputes such findings). See generally Sheryl Stolberg, Unwilling Fighter
in War on Secondhand Smoke, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at Al (establishing that tobacco industry research
finds secondhand smoke is little more than a nuisance).
14. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMTEE, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 13, at 6 (Mar. 22, 1994)
(indicating that a nonsmoking waiter recently received over $80,000 in a workers' compensation claim for a
heart attack he suffered and claimed was caused by environmental tobacco smoke); see also Stolberg, supra
note 13 (claiming there have been dozens of lawsuits and workers' compensation cases filed nationwide by
victims of secondhand smoke, that California has long been considered the leader in the anti-smoking
movement, that a former Los Angeles teacher won $29,999 in a workers' compensation claim for damaged
lungs due to breathing secondhand smoke from a teachers lounge, and that a San Francisco Bay Area waiter
who received a $90,000 settlement from a workers' compensation claim for a heart attack caused by years of
working in a smoky restaurant). But see Ubhi v. Patterson, No. SFO-0341691 (Cal. Workers' Comp. App. Bd.
Mar. 11, 1991) (order approving compromise and release) (copy on file with Pacific Law Journal) (showing
that Ubhi, the San Francisco waiter that brought the heart attack claim, allegedly caused by environmental
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Additionally, Chapter 310 places all businesses on equal economic footing, by
preempting local ordinances with uniform state standards.' 5 This ban of smoking
is consistent with national trends.'6
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tobacco smoke, actually received a compromise settlement of $9500 from the State Compensation Insurance
Fund, minus $2376 for his attorney fees, plus the cost of medical expenses).
15. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 310); see id. (stating that this statute eliminates
the need for local governments to enact workplace smoking restrictions within their respective jurisdictions);
see also SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMrTFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 13, at 5 (Mar. 22, 1994) (noting that
a statewide uniform standard is necessary to ensure equal competition between cities for tourist and convention
business).
16. H.R. 881, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1993); see id. (proposing a ban on smoking tobacco in all
Federal buildings); H.R. 3434, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2701, 2703 (1993) (proposing a ban on smoking
tobacco within or near the entrance/exit of all public facilities nationwide). This proposed ban would not
preempt local or state laws. Id.; see also Edwin Chen, White House Seeks Wide Smoking Ban, L.A. TIMEs, Mar.
26, 1994, at Al (stating the Clinton administration has proposed a nationwide ban on indoor smoking wherever
people work, that the Defense Department announced a worldwide ban on smoking in its workplace, and that
McDonald's, Taco Bell, and Jack-in-the-Box have banned smoking by all their customers and employees in
their establishments); RJ. Ignelzi, Flash Points in a Long-Smoldering Issue, S.D. UNION-TRIB., May 8, 1994,
at D2 (reporting that the Clintons ban smoking at the White House, Amtrak bans smoking on most nationwide
routes, and Congress banned smoking in all public and some private schools).
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